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  Abstract 
 
The present paper analyses motivation, entry modes and strategies of foreign banks 
entering into the Russian market. The share of foreign assets in the banking sector is 
gradually increasing, proving the fact that more and more foreign banks show their 
interest in the Russian banking sector. What lies behind this growth? The article 
shows that motivation for entry is similar to some other developing and transition 
economies (both PUSH and PULL reasons exist) and presents some peculiar features 
concerning the modes of entry and strategies. It is shown that recently organic 
strategy growth is gradually replaced by M&A. 
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Financial liberalization plays an important role in establishing sustainable financial 
system. The discussion about access of foreign banks to financial (banking) systems 
of developing and transition economies is relatively new. In 1990s in the beginning of 
transition period from planned to a market economy, many American economists 
stressed the importance of establishment of a stable financial system by the 
development of capital markets, while many European researchers on economics 
claimed for the development of efficient banking sector. Needless to say, that both 
these controversial at first sight approaches considerably influenced on the financial 
system of transition and developing economies and were used as an institutional base 
for its creation. In particular, Central and East European Countries (CEEC) followed 
the approach of establishing a solid banking system.  Gradual financial liberalization 
in these countries allowed opening domestic banking markets for foreign investors, as 
the result foreign banks received control and dominance in the region which in most 
cases resulted in creation of a stable banking sector from the institutional point of 
view. In countries like Estonia foreign share participation in banking assets amounts 
to almost 100% (Vernikov, 2002). 
    Needless to say, that in Russia the problem of foreign banks activity is a prominent 
issue as well. The share of non-residents in the banking sector is gradually increasing 
and some economists are apt to consider the repetition of the Eastern-European 
scenario (dominant position of foreign banks in national economies) in Russian 
conditions.  
    The present paper aims to investigate activity of foreign banks from the point of 
view of both home country and host country (Russia). While acknowledging the role 
of multinational banking theory (MNBs)
1) in investigating multinational (foreign) 
banks’ activity primarily from the viewpoint of a home country, we stress the 
indispensability to examine specific conditions of the host country.  
The structure of the paper is as follows. In the first part we outline the general 
situation with foreign investments into the Russian banking sector and shortly present 
indicators showing foreign banks’ participation in the Russian banking system.  Here 
some remarks should be made about the definition of a foreign bank. In the present 
paper we consider a bank to be a foreign one, if it is registered as a banking institution 
in a foreign country. This definition is used by the Russian Central Bank (CBR) and 
also common in some other countries (e.g. Japan). Therefore, entry modes like 
                                                        
1) Multinational bank theory (MNBs) emerged from the theory on multinational corporations (MNCs) 
developed by many researches, such as Rugman (1981), Dunning (1992), Bryant (1987), and so on. 
Researchers on foreign banking and multinational banking recently apply the term “theory of 
multinational banking” in their studies, though initially United Nations Center on Transnational 
Corporations introduced the term “multinational bank” in 1981. According to their definition 
multinational bank is “a bank having more than 5 affiliates or subsidiaries abroad and organizing 
commercial banking activity”. But due to the diversification and complication of the banking 
transactions at the present stage of development of banking activity in general, we argue that this 
definition needs some revision. In essence, any foreign bank doing business abroad nowadays can be 
categorized as a multinational one to some extent (Gorshkov, 2011).   3
representative offices are also considered to be foreign banks though normally in the 
host countries they are not engaged in banking operations
2). 
From the second part of the paper we gradually conduct the analysis of foreign 
banks’ activities from the point of view of both home and host countries. Usually for 
investigation of foreign banks’ activity the theory of multinational banking (MNBs) is 
being applied, but we argue that the theory of foreign banking
3) allows making a 
better analysis from the view of a host country (for details refer Figure 1).  
    Nevertheless, some peculiar strategies of foreign banks by their home countries are 
obvious and we also included them into the subject of the research. Keeping these 
assumptions in mind, we examine motivation of foreign banks’ entry in part 2, modes 
of entry in part 3 and evolution of foreign banks’ strategies is being presented in part 
4 of the present paper. Some qualitative and quantitative analyses of foreign banks in 
the Russian market proving the increasing presence of foreign banks in Russia have 
been covered in some other studies (Rozhinskiy, 2006, 2008; Bobkova, 2007; 
Khandruev, 2008; Gorshkov, 2011). Nevertheless, we also present some statistical 
data about activity of foreign banks in Russia. 
 
 
Figure 1 – Conceptive representation of the foreign bank theory 
 










MNBs theory (home country approach) 
 
Source: made by author 
                                                        
2) There are two definitions of a foreign bank: juridical and a quantitative one. Foreign bank (juridical 
definition) – the bank that is registered in accordance with the foreign country’s legislation (non-
resident). Bank with foreign participation (less than 50% shares), bank controlled by non-residents 
(more than 50% shares). Foreign bank (quantitative definition) – classification of banks in accordance 
with the share of foreign investments. For details see Vernikov (2006). 
3) Some researches stress the importance of analyzing the activity of foreign banks in national 
economies (Vernikov (2002,2004,2006), Rozinskij (2006, 2008, 2009). The theory of foreign banking 
as a definite concept is not widely acknowledged, but while acknowledging the importance of MNBs 
approach, we argue in the paper that this approach allows a proper investigation of foreign banks’ 






























   1. Foreign investments into the Russian banking sector and foreign 
banks’ activity 
 
In Russia the process of liberalization in the banking started in 1990s. Many 
domestic banks were created and some foreign banks got access to the Russian market. 
At first, the Central Bank of Russia (CBR) strictly restricted the activity of foreign 
banks. In 1990s the upper limit of foreign capital participation was established to 12%, 
procedure of licensing was implemented, some operations of foreign banks were 
actually prohibited (Presidential Act No 1924 on “Temporary prohibition of foreign 
banks’ activities with Russian physical and juridical entities” dated by 17.11.1993). 
At present, the activity of foreign banks is being regulated by federal law “Banks and 
banking activity” (1996) and by regulative acts of the CB (e.g. Regulation No 437 
“About procedures of registration of financial institutions with non-residents capital” 
dated by 23.04.1997). These documents generally stipulate three major conditions 
(regulations) for foreign banks’ activity in Russia: 1) negative stance towards creation 
of branch offices (actual prohibition), 2) upper limit of foreign capital participation in 
the capital of banking system (12% during 1990s, in the process of negotiations for 
WTO accession it was agreed to raise the limit to 50%, though no official documents 
have been signed), 3) licensing system and issuing of permissions for the start-up 
activities of foreign banks.  
Before examining the activity of foreign banks on the Russian market, let us 
present the general situation with foreign investments into the Russian banking sector. 
Two ideas are expressively shown in many research studies about the role of foreign 
investments (foreign banks) in the Russian banking sector: overestimation vs. 
underestimation. We do not argue the background of the two in the present paper, 
both of them having their arguments, but we mainly support the idea that despite the 
fact of gradual increase of non-residential share in the market, the magnitude of their 
actual activity remains quite slow (data supporting this idea will be presented below). 
For a start, Table 1 represents international investment position of the Russian 
banking sector and the data shows that foreign investments are increasing (excluding 
years of crisis and recovery from it, but the general trend is positive).  However, the 
share of FDI is very low, other investments sharing a majority. Other investments 
may include financial credits of foreign investors to the banking sector of Russia, 
syndicated loans, cross-boarder lending schemes, others. Having these figures in mind, 
the activity of foreign banks is hardly to depict, due to the fact that the vague 
character of the overall picture of the investment position (net investment position is 
negative, meaning that Russia is a net debtor in the banking sector). However, the 
general trend for the FDI inflow is positive, proving the fact that foreign share in 
banking assets is increasing. But the total level of foreign investments into financial 






4) Analytical data for 2009 from www.kmpg.de. Majority of investments still flow to natural resource 
industry, industrial sector, trade and other sectors (the web-site accessed 15.01.2011)   5
 
Table 1  - International investment position of the Russian banking sector 
 (million US dollars) 
 
  2005  2006  2007 2008 2009  2010 
Assets 25,989  39,182  65,351  96,843  167,825  165,965
FDI from Russia  818  1,498  1,570  2,533  3,413  5,062 
Portfolio investments  3,714  6,964  7,645  12,855  15,774  26,258 
Other investments  21,304  30,669  55,914  80,032  143,336  132,423
Financial derivatives  153  51  222  1,423  5,302  2,222 
Liabilities 37,337  60,009  123,927 214,771  206,259  179,123
FDI to Russia  3,020  4,975  9,127  20,682  22,670  25,911 
Portfolio  investments  3,756 6,858 17,171 36,445 12,160  26,516 
Other investments  30,372  48,124  97,451  156,769  161,033  121,614
Financial derivatives  189  52  178  875  10,396  5,082 
Net investment position  -11,348  -20,827  -58,576  -117,928  -38,434  -13,158 
Source: Central Bank of Russia (CBR), www.cbr.ru 
 
 
To be more specific, below we focus on the foreign banks as participants in the 
Russian banking sector. In case of Russia the size of banking sector is relatively small 
and for a long time it was dominated by the state (Kievskiy, 2008). It functions 
inefficiently even after the financial liberalization reforms performed in the 1990s, but 
besides this fact the foreign share in banking assets and capital is increasing (Table 2). 
The banking sector at present is still presented by state-owned banks such as 
Sberbank and Vneshtorgbank whose share in total banking assets and capital is very 
high, but gradual competition from foreigners’ side is likely to happen.  
Below we consider the role of the foreign banks in deposits, corporate lending and 
retail banking. The role of foreign banks in deposits is not high, foreign share in 
deposits of the banking system amounts to 12%. In TOP-30 deposit banks there are 
only two foreign banks, Raiffeisen (Austria) stands on the 6
th place, Citibank is on the 
26
th. Deposit scale of Raiffeisen constitutes only 1/29
th of that of Sberbank, proving 
the fact that state-owned banks and Russian private banks remain predominant 
position in deposit activities.  
Corporate loans of foreign banks were common even during 1990s and continued 
positive growth in 2000s. In 2003 the sum amounted to 38 billion US dollars. But the 
role of foreign banks in project financing, syndicated loans is immense (for details 
refer to Gorshkov, 2010). Some banks are trying to establish strong positions in retail 
banking (Russfinancebank (5
th place), Raiffeisen (9
th place), Societe Generale (20
th 
place, Citibank (22d place). In general, the common trend for foreign banks is the 
following: 1) foreign banks are mostly engaged in traditional banking activities 
(deposit, lending, foreign exchange activity); 2) foreign exchange activity (foreign 
currency operations) amounts for around 60% of total profits; 3) some foreign banks 
establish business providing non-traditional banking services
5); 4) scales of cross-
                                                        
5) For example, internet banking (Omnibank (50% shares belong to Japanese SBC Holding), consulting, 
investment banking (Deutschebank, Citibank).   6
boarder financing, syndicated loans, project finance should be also considered when 
accessing the role of foreign banks in the Russian market (Gorshkov, 2010).  
 
 
Table 2  - Some indicators of foreign banks’ activity in Russia 
 
Source: Central Bank of Russia (CBR), www.cbr.ru 
 
    Below we focus on the motivation, entry modes and strategies of the foreign banks 




     2. Motivation of entry 
 
 As of January 2011 220 foreign banks operated in Russia. The number of foreign 
banks decreased in comparison to the previous year, but not very considerably. In 
general from 2000s the number of foreign banks is steadily increasing. Major 
indicators of foreign banks’ activity as shown in Table 1 were also increasing. 
Therefore, it is possible to conclude that the interest of foreign banks in the Russian 
market  was obvious. But what lies behind this growth? On the institutional level 
there were not so many changes during 2000s, but foreigners showed a high interest 
in entering into the Russian market. 
During Soviet Union times the position of the state towards foreign banks’ entry 
was quite negative, therefore it was very difficult for foreigners to invest into the 
banking sector (Rozinskiy, 2007). The Russian government changed this course of 
actions and started the policy of promoting of foreign investments. Thus, foreign 
  2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008  2009 2010  2011 
Number of banks with 
FP 
incl、share of more 
than 51％ 














































Commercial banks with foreign participation of more than 51％  （％）   
Assets    8.1 7.4 7.6 8.3  12.1 17.2  18.7 18.3  18.0 
Equity（Capital）  7.1 6.6 7.8 9.3 12.7 15.7  17.3 17.0  19.1 
Corporate loans 
(companies) 
7.1 6.1 6.2 7.4 10.0 15.5  16.6 14.8  15.1 
Private loans 
(households) 
2.3 2.3 3.0 3.4 6.2 8.9  10.3  12.0  11.5 
Commercial banks with 100% foreign participation   (％）   
Assets  5.6 5.6 5.9 8.0 9.0 11.6 13.0  11.3  11.0 
Equity（Capital）  5.4 5.4 6.3 9.0 10.1 11.1  12.2 11.0  12.1 
Corporate loans 
(companies) 
5.5 4.6 4.6 7.3 7.9 10.7 11.6  9.0  9.2 
Private loans 
(households) 
1.5 1.5 2.4 3.3 4.1 5.0  5.4 6.2  5.3   7
banks received more opportunities to enter into the Russian market. In addition, high 
economic growth in 2000s also facilitated the process of entry. 
 
 



















Source: made by author on the base of statistic data of CBR, www.cbr.ru 
 
When analyzing the motivation of foreign banks’ entry from the view point of a 
home country and host country, it is important to investigate so-called PUSH and 
PULL reasons.  
After the transformation in 1990s there operated a lot of foreign banks in Russia: 
International Moscow Bank (1989, Germany and Finland), Home Credit Bank (1990, 
Czech Republic), Calyon Rus Bank (1991, France), Bank of China (1993, China), 
Credit Suisse Bank (1993, Switzerland), Absolut Bank (1993, Belarus), Raiffeisen 
Bank(1996, France). These banks share up to 50% of all 100%-foreign owned banks 
at present. Despite the fact that during this period the financial system was very 
fragile and instable, banks tried to enter the market mostly motivated by so-called 
PUSH reasons (originating in the host country or in management of banks). In this 
sense the strategy of banks correspond to the one in other developing countries
6). 
Nevertheless, the PUSH reasons for motivation to Russian market differed a bit from 
the other developing economies, due to the fact that there was no such motivation as 
escape from domestic financial regulation, increased competition or drastic drop in 
domestic profits in home countries. PUSH reasons for entering Russian market were 
mostly composed by such motivation as political interactions and historical ties 
between Russian and some home countries of foreign banks. This fact explains the 
entry choice of banks like Bank of China, Bank of Scotland, French banks, etc. 
In many cases foreign banks are attracted by high economic development growth 
of home countries. This was also true for Russia during 2000s when most of banks 
                                                        
6) For details for other developing economies see studies of Vernikov, 2005).  
   8
entering the market were driven by so-called PULL reasons. High development 
growth attracted not only banks, but also some foreign companies. In order to provide 
financial services to their customers, banks were subject to enter the market as well. 
This so-called “follow the customer” strategy was particularly typical for many 
Japanese banks. For Mitsubishi-Tokyo UFJ and Mizuho Corporation the main goal 
for establishment of a affiliated bank in Russia was to provide full support to Japanese 
companies and make investment into big projects. Deposit activities, operations with 
individuals are not yet a priority. Same is true for the Sumitomo-Mitsui Banking 
Corporation that opened an office in Moscow only in 2009. The reasons for this slow 
movement of Japanese banks are insufficient development of infrastructure, lack of 
transparency of the Russian economy, hindrances when entering the market.  In 
comparison to the European banks, the Japanese banks operating on the Russian 
market are less competitive and prefer to stick to the “main bank “ features when 
establishing relations with their clients. Though some banks like Toyota Bank (2008) 
trying to establish retail banking (automobile loans) or SBI Holdings (2010) that 
invested 50% into Russian Obibank in order to launch internet banking business claim 
for other reasons for motivation of entry into the Russian market among Japanese 
banks
7). 
Needless to say, that to explain the motivation of entry of foreign banks to the 
Russian market only by political and “follow the customer” hypotheses is very 
difficult. Toyota putting efforts into development of retail banking is not the only 
foreign bank working in this direction. High economic growth before the 2008 crisis 
and gradual recovering from its consequences stipulated higher level of consumption, 
which was partially driven by retail bank loans. Some foreign banks like American 
Express Bank(2005), Mersedes Benz Bank(2007), Rabobank(2008), Volkswagen 
Rus(2010) decided to expand their business to Russia. We can consider this group of 
banks to be motivated by so –called PULL reasons (originated in a home country). 
Moreover, there are many factors (macroeconomic and structural imbalances of the 
economy, lack of creditability towards financial institutions, high country risk, etc.) 
that stipulate high potential banking profits of the Russian banking market.  Therefore, 
among the PULL reasons there is also so-called “high risk-high return” motivation of 
entry. Many banks that entered during 2000s or those that entered before, but decided 
to expand their business even more can represent this group of banks. For example, 
for Raiffeisen Group (Austria) the Russian market is the second largest one after 
Austria. Initially the Group entered in 1996, but in 2000s Raiffeisen changed its 
motivation completely and started building the huge network in order to increase its 
presence in Russia. By investing into Russian Rosbank, the management of Raiffeisen 
tries to establish strong system of retail banking
8).  
 Maintenance of the image of a foreign bank can be also one of the motivations of 
entry. For banks operating globally, not having an office in new emerging economies 
like China, India, Brazil or Russia, is always a problem of own banking image 
(Vernikov, 2002). 
     Historical  and  political  reasons  might be also the decisive one for making the 
decision of entry. For example, Societe Generale first operated in Russia in 19
th 
century and officially established a representative office in 1973. Needless to say, it is 
                                                        
7) Such as exploring new business opportunities, a change towards leadership. 
8) For detail see website of Raiffeisen bank, Vernikov (2004), etc.   9
also one of the most successful foreign banks in Russia nowadays
9). Some other 








Source: made by author with references by Vernikov (2002,2004,2005); web-sites of foreign banks; Rosia NIS 
Keizaikenkyujyo. Rosia no ginkou, kinyuu bumon no saishinjijyo, March 2007, Shadanhoujin Rosia 
NIS Boekikai Rosia NIS Keizaikenkyujyo, pp.96 (in Japanese) 
 
From data presented in Table 3 and the above analysis let us stress the following.  
Firstly, foreign banks entering Russia in general use the same motivation reasoning 
as in other developing countries, though escape from regulation in home countries or 
low domestic profits are not necessarily behind this entry motivation. Secondly, both 
PUSH and PULL reasons were identified among the motivation of banks. PULL 
reasons driven by high economic growth which attracts foreign investments and 
stipulates foreign banks’ entry. At the same time we stressed the fact that PUSH 
reasons are also quite strong. Thirdly, there are multiple reasons for entry. Banks tend 
to change their motivation in accordance with the changing conditions (i.g. after the 
collapse of the Soviet Union some banks reconsidered their motivation for stay on the 
                                                        
9) Societe Generale started operating in Russia in 19
th century. In those days it provided consulting 
services and financed Russian companies. In order to expand its business in 1901 Societe Generale 
opened a branch in St.Petesburg (Severniy Bank) and organized financing of the Russian economy. 10 
years after Severniy Bank was emerged with Russian-Chinese Bank and Russian-Asian Bank was 
formed. In 1914 this bank was the leading one among all other banks operating in Russia, its shares in 
assets amounted to 84% of those of Societe Generale. In 1917 due to the Russian revolution the activity 
of the bank was stopped. In 1973 a representative office in Moscow was established, and during 1990-s 
following the financial liberalization, Sociate Generale opened a subsidiary in Russia (from the 
materials of the website of Societe Generale). 




High risk-high return  PULL 
 
 
Raiffeisen (Austria), Societe Generale (France), BNP 
Pariba Group (France), ING Group (Holland), Deutsche 
Bank(Germany), Bank of Cyprus (Cyprus)   
Development of retail banking   PULL  Toyota Bank (Japan), Mercedes Bentz (Germany), 
American Express Bank (USA)  
Preservation of “global bank” 
status  
PUSH City  Group（USA） 
Banks having strong relations 
with Russian companies and 
individual customers aiming to 
establish a profound network on 
the Russian market  
PUSH 
 
Raiffeisen (Austria), Societe Generale (France), ING 
Group (Holland)  
Support of foreign companies 





Eurasia Tokyo-Mitsubishi UFJ (Japan), Sumitomo-
Mitsui Europe (Japan), Mizuho Bank(Moscow) (Japan), 
Toyota Bank (Japan)  
Escape of costs, rising 
competition, loss of profits in a 
home country  
PUSH  Establishment of a subsidiary is very costly and risky in 
Russia. Examples of banks used this motivation are not 
common 
Non-economic, historical 
reasons (importance of the past) 
PUSH/PULL These reasons are common for entry at early stages. 
There are some studies showing that banks like Sociate 
Generale or Gredit Lyonnais already operated in Russia 
in 19-20 th centuries.   10
Russian market). Fourthly, we identified non-economic reasons for initial entry 
(political, global image of banks, historical ties) and stressed their importance.  In 
general, with the change of the economic structure of Russia, many banks tend to 
change their motivation and strategy as well. It is possible to assume that the 
“leadership” hypothesis is gradually replacing “follow the customer” one.  
 
    
   3. Entry modes of foreign banks 
 
Foreign banks entering the Russian market use different entry modes. If we use the 
wide definition of a foreign bank (juridical one), it is possible to divide 4 types of 
entry modes at present: subsidiary, JV with a Russian bank, minor shareholder 
participation and representative office.  
Representative office is the most common entry mode for starting a business in 
Russia for many foreign banks.  Although representative office doesn't provide 
banking services, it helps the parent banks in home countries to collect information 
about Russian market and provide it to its clients. After a few years a representative 
office is usually converted into a subsidiary (Russian juridical entity).  Most of the 
banks operating in Russia used this approach, because establishment of a subsidiary 
requires a lot of preliminary work (licensing by CBR, accreditation of documents, 
etc.). The typical situation for Russia is that foreign banks tend to create 100% foreign 
share subsidiary, i.g. owned by a parent bank. There is still mistrust and low 
transparency level of property rights protection. In 2011 the number of 100% foreign 
share banks amounted to 80
11).  
Establishment of branches is not common. Only one foreign bank branch was 
established in 1990 by Armenian bank “Anelik”, but even it was converted into a 
subsidiary in 2003.  Law does not officially prohibit branches, but due to some 
bureaucracy restrictions, there are not very common. When establishing a subsidiary 
the key question for many foreign banks is the problem of right of control and 
management. Participation as minor shareholder or intention to acquire more than 
50% shares is a key dilemma for the management of many foreign banks. As 
statistical data shows, majority of banks prefer to establish 100% foreign owned 
subsidiaries due to low transparency of property rights law in Russia 
Joint venture business among Russian and foreign banks is also not very common. 
Therefore, it is possible to conclude that entry modes of foreign banks are stipulated 
by sensibility of ownership and property rights issues.  
As for the participation as a minor shareholder, as of January 2010 there were 118 
banks that amounted to more than a half of banks with foreign participation: 33 banks 
with less than 1% foreign share, 60 banks where foreign investments amounted to 1-
20% and 25 banks with foreign share participation 20-50%. On the one hand banks 
try to follow the strategy “ownership right=dominance”, but on the other hand they 
agree to be a minor shareholder, but to be presented on the market (Vernikov, 2002).  
The entry modes are therefore representing this dual structure (100% control vs. 
minor participation).  
Another interesting fact proving the increasing participation of foreign banks as 
minor shareholders is the degree of shares controlled by non-residents in main state-
                                                        
11) Official statistic of the CBR.   11
owned banks. In Sberbank the shares controlled by non-residents amount to 32%, in 
Vnestorgbank Bank of New York International Nominees control 16% of shares. 
Both these figures are being very compelling investments and state the relatively 
liberal nature of the Russian banking system. 
 
    4.  Strategies of foreign banks  
    
In general, the strategies of foreign banks in the Russian market are similar to the 
ones in other developing economies aiming to get stable profits. In particular, banks 
try to acquire a market niche, develop new market segments, and expand their 
business. All these actions substantially define the behavior of foreign banks. In case 
of entry into the developing countries foreign banks normally use two strategies: 
organic growth
12) and acquisition of rivals (M&A). In most cases in countries where 
privatization reforms in the banking sector were made, M&A was a dominant strategy 
of foreign banks (Rybin, 2007). In Russia, on the contrast, privatization of the 
banking sector by foreigners was a very slow and complicated process; therefore 
banks that entered the market in 1990s such as Raiffeisen or Citibank mostly used the 
“organic growth strategy” and started their business from scratch. 
 Organic growth strategy is very moderate and limited one. One the one hand, it 
allows to escape problems with management, dissolve differences in the process of 
integration of business of home and host countries, but on the other hand it has 
demerits like low speed of implementation and high level of costs. In Russia a huge 
amount of financial resources is needed for starting-up a new business. Foreign 
investments often have to pay an expensive “entrance fee” when entering into the 
Russian market. Moreover, factors like excessive segmentation of the market, 
regional diversity, strong positions of domestic (both state and private) banks, make it 
difficult for foreign banks to set up their businesses with the usage of organic growth 
strategy and acquire the dominant or competitive position (Vernikov, 2002).  
In contrast to the organic strategy growth, in 2000s M&A became more common. 
It is hard to conclude that banks do not use the organic growth strategy (some banks 
like Deutshe Bank, Michinoku (Mizuho at present) still follow it), but the number of 
banks expanding their presence on the Russian market by M&A is increasing.  
From the theory we know that motivations for M&A are expansion of market share, 
increase of capital, intensification of competition. Same idea is true for the Russian 
market. M&A are increasing very fast becoming one of the process of reforms in the 
banking sector. Economic growth requires huge amount of inflows of money, but 
Russian banking sector is unable to fulfill this demand. M&A are a possible solution 
for resolving the problem of obsolete banking technologies, and intense competition 
from foreign banks allows speeding up the process of development of the Russian 
banking sector (Rybin, 2008).  
Below we analyze the dynamic of M&A in a financial sector in Russia. Increasing 
M&A cases and raising market prices of deals testify the positive dynamics of M&A 
strategy in Russia in the banking sector (see Figure 3, 4). In 2006 M&A in the 
financial sector amounted to 7.1% of all M&A deals and in 2008 this figure became 
                                                        
12) Organic growth strategy is the one aiming expansion of business and is fully based on the internal 
resources of a foreign bank. It is normally very costly and takes a lot of time to implement.    12
9%.  M&A trends accompany the general dynamic of foreign capital participation in 
the economy of Russia (most deals out-in) (Rybin, 2008). 
M&A process in Russia can be divided into several steps. Before the introduction 
of market mechanisms and until the financial crisis of 1998, participation of foreign 
capital in the banking sector was limited, which is different from the situation in Latin 
America and CEEC. Russian Central Bank determined the upper limit of participation 
of foreign capital and aimed to control the banking sector. During this period banks 
operating in Russia tended to use organic growth strategy. Raiffeisen, Austria Bank 
had plans to expand their business to CEEC and CIS. Banks like Chase Manhattan, 
ABN Amro Bank used the “follow the customer” approach and supported foreign 
companies operating in Russia. During this period because of imperfection of 
institutional base and negative attitude towards foreign investments, M&A was not 
common. Banks preferred to create 100% foreign owned subsidiaries (Kulik, 2006; 
Rybin, 2007, 2008).  
   
Figure 3(left), 4(right) – M&A in the Russian financial sector 2006-2009 
 (billion dollars, %) 
 
Source: www.kpmg.de M&A in Russia, accessed 15.01.2011 
 
  In 2003-2004 Russian economy showed positive sign of growth, investment 
climate improved, linkages between banks increased that resulted in a higher 
transparency of the business rules in Russia. As the result many foreign banks made 
decision to come to the market. Although there still remained some negative trends 
from the first stage like low level of transparency of the banking sector as the whole, 
economical and institutional barriers, problem of WTO accession.  
Nevertheless, during 2003-2004 foreign banks started using M&A as the method to 
get access on the market more and more often. Gradually the green-field investment 
type gave place to the brown-field one. Banks acquired at this stage were mostly the 
ones that already had a small share of foreign capital or the medium-sized one that 
were quite strong in a particular banking sector. In literature this period of M&A is 
called the “potentially covered period of M&A” (Rybin, 2007). 
In 2005-2006 the potential period of M&A growth in banking was changed by an 
open stage. M&A cases and market deals drastically increased, targets for merger and 
acquisitions were shifted to larger banks, banks with a strong retail network and some 
small banks.   For example, Societe Generale (France) bought 20＋1% shares of 
Rosbank which has a strong retail customer network in 2006. Raiffeisen also acquired 
Investbank that has a very strong retail and regional presence. Reasons for acquiring 
banks with developed retail network are obvious: escape of initial costs of investment   13
for developing a segment
13) and of course entry into the potentially profitable market 
segment
14). Regional banks as the rule have a strong brand name and have a good 
reputation among the established group of customers, therefore acquiring of such a 
partner for a foreign bank is a good deal. Acquisition of small-sized banks can be 
explained by the desire of banks to escape transaction costs of establishing a direct 
subsidiary (licensing by the CBR, other administrative and institutional procedures)
15). 
In 2007-2008 Russian banking sector was showing positive dynamics. In 2007 69 
M&A cases were registered in the financial sector with the total market value of 2.6 
billion. Domestic transaction amounted to 53% in 2009, deals out-in amounted to 
28%, showing positive trends in foreign banks’ entry. Despite the existing deterrents 
(low transparency of the banking system, etc.), not only foreign banks, but also 
financial groups and investment funds started implementing M&A in the Russian 
market
16) (Rybin, 2007, 2008).  
Financial and economic crisis in 2008 significantly influenced on the dynamics of 
M&A transactions. In 2009 the number of M&A cases in the banking sector 
decreased, total market transactions value experienced a drop by 84.5% (from 11 
billion to 2 billion dollars). In 2010 the positive dynamics of M&A was restores 
followed by the gradual recovery of financial liquidity of the banks that suffered the 
consequences of the crisis. 
On the other side, domestic wave of M&A is of some interest and can be explained 
by enlargement of banks in order to fulfill the restrictions on minimum capital 
requirements (Russia is gradually increasing the upper limit of the charter capital of 
banks).  M&A cases when large Moscow banks acquire regional banks that are 
strong in retail banking became more common. Most M&A are friendly ones and are 
driven by the necessity to resolve problems of low capitalization of Russian banks.  
Alongside with this, Russian banks also show high interest in expanding their 
business abroad. This feature is a peculiar one and explains to some extent the 
specificity of the Russian market. Some domestic banks being a part of large financial 
industrial groups (Gazprombank) have potential to acquire assets of banks abroad. 
But in majority of cases due to the problem of undercapitalization, Russian banks tend 
to acquire even less capitalized banks of CIS countries. In 2005 the total market 
transaction value of deals out-in with the participation of Russian banks amounted to 
113 million dollars and further increased in 2006. In 2007 banks like Slavneft 
(Belarus), Areksimbank (Armenia) were acquired
17 ). Russian banks used dual 
motivation for entering into the CIS markets: providing support and financial services 
to Russian companies operating in CIS countries (e.g. “follow the customer” 
approach) and showing interest in potential development of the region (PULL 
reasons). 
In general, it is possible to conclude that M&A in Russia show a different strategy 
of foreign banks from that of evolutional one (“organic growth”). Number of M&A in 
the Russian financial sector is increasing, this new strategy of development of foreign 
banks has some specific features: 1) targets of M&A shifted from medium-sized 
                                                        
13) Buying a competitor with an established network is easier. 
14) Boom of retail banking in Russia stipulated by high economic growth. 
15) Major M&A transaction are listed in Gorshkov (2010), Bogdanov (2008). 
16) For example,  Merill Lynch invested in TIB Holding that had an affiliated financial institution in 
Russia) 
17) In 2006 Vneshtorgbank acquired 98% of shares of AKB Armiya (Ukraine), Sberbank bought 100% 
shares of TechsakaBank (Kazakhstan).    14
banks to regional (local) ones, 2) increase of banks with strong retail business 
network, 3) dominance of friendly M&A, 4) dominance of domestic M&A driven by 
the problem of undercapitalization, 5) increase of in-out M&A by Russian banks. As 
the result, the concentration of capital in the banking sector is increasing both by 
foreign and domestic capital. Russian large banks acquire small-sized domestic banks, 
while foreign banks are more interested in medium-sized banks having wide and 
stable regional networks.  M&A strategy is chosen by foreign banks in order to escape 
costs of permission acquirement from CBR, costs of establishment of an affiliate and 
some other transaction costs. Moreover, M&A strategy is used to establish retail 
banking in Russia (Kulik, 2006), as it helps to become competitive at once in contrast 
to the strategy of organic growth. Therefore, it is possible to conclude the strategy of 
foreign banks on the Russian market is gradually changing; the shift towards M&A 
financed by parent banks is becoming more obvious.  
 
  5. Conclusion 
  
High economic growth in Russia in 2000s and positioning of Russia as an 
emerging economy with a stable growing economy resulted in a foreign investment 
boom that was extended into the banking sector. Foreign banks entering Russia 
stimulate the inflow of FDI into other sectors and indirectly contribute to the 
improvement of investment climate of Russia. Foreign banks bring new banking 
technologies and financial products into the Russian market. Therefore, their positive 
impact is significant.  
Needless to say, that with foreign banks entering the Russian market, the banking 
sector itself is subject to transformation and changes. Some of them include reduction 
or merging of small-sized banks, increase of the minimum capital requirement rates, 
growing banking assets and capital. Despite the fact that Russian banking sector was 
liberalized in 1990s, its development is often considered as immature in comparison 
to other developed economies due to the fact that there are problems with market 
quality, low level of banking infrastructure and moreover non-fulfillment of 
intermediary function
18) by majority of banks.  
Some other specific features of the Russian banking sector are its extra-
segmentation, strong presence of the government, concentration of all operations 
towards large-sized banks, existence of huge amount of small-sized banks, 
undercapitalization of the banking sector, regional differences.  
Despite the fact that there are obviously some negative features for FDI 
participation in the banking sector, more and more banks are showing interest in the 
Russian market. As it was shown in the present paper, foreign share in total banking 
assets, capital, deposits and lending is increasing. Some foreign banks try to develop 
traditional banking services (deposit, lending, settlement of accounts) competing with 
state-owned and Russian private banks, others prefer to entry into the particular 
market segments (retail banking (Toyota Bank) or investment banking (Deutsche 
Bank)). Share of foreign banks in traditional banking services is still quite low and 
                                                        
18) Intermediary function – one of the three traditional banking functions, meaning the role of banks in 
attracting financial resources in the form of deposits and their allocation among other industries in the 
form of investments. For Russia both deposits and lending rates are quite low in comparison to other 
countries. Companies tend to attract financing directly from capital markets or use internal resources.     15
their role is rather limited, but foreign banks’ participation in syndicated loans, project 
financing, cross-boarder lending is quite high.  
The motivation of entry into the Russian market could be explained by both PUSH 
and PULL reasons. Non-economic motivation (political, historical, support of global 
image) comprising the PUSH reasons together with high economic growth and 
improved investment climate (PULL reasons) fully represent the specific features for 
foreign banks entry into the Russian market in 2000s.  From the example of foreign 
banks shown in the present paper, we found that there are multiple reasons for entry 
and that motivation for entry is subject to change in accordance to the structure of 
market or trends in economic growth. In other words, foreign banks influence 
considerably on the Russian banking sector, and in turn economic development of 
host country and specific features of its banking sector also influence on the 
background of foreign banks’ motivation.  
Mutual relationship between foreign banks motivation and banking sector of a 
particular country can be fully expressed in analysis of entry modes and strategies of 
foreign banks. As for the entry modes, in accordance with the Russian legislation 
there are such types as representative offices, JSC, subsidiaries, participation as 
minor shareholders. Representative offices are fulfilling banking operations; therefore 
they are not counted as financial institutions in Russia. But for the purpose of entry 
modes analysis it is worth including them as initial forms of entry
19). On entering into 
the Russian market, majority of banks established representative offices and later 
converted them into subsidiary (evolution of forms of entry). Legislative and 
institutional restrictions and limitations of the Russian banking system, position of the 
government and some other factors significantly affect decision-making process about 
entry modes of foreign banks.  
 In addition, in terms of strategy, it was shown in the present paper that foreign 
banks gradually substitute the “organic growth” approach by M&A. M&A is common 
not only in the form out-in, but also in-out and in-in, meaning that activity of foreign 
banks considerably influence on the internal structure of the Russian banking sector.  
Motivation, entry modes and strategies significantly influence on the banking 
sector in Russia and should be examined from both home country and host country 
approaches. Russian banking market is very specific, and in understanding the basic 
activities of foreign banks it is necessary to explore this specificity in close relation 
with the viewpoint of home country. In short, the theory of foreign banking, although 
not theoretically deeply shaped, might be found a sufficient one in achieving these 
goals.  
Leading role of state-owned banks at some development stage of the banking 
sector is necessary, but it cannot last for long. Expanding needs of economy in 
investments evoke many changes in the structure of the banking sector itself. Growing 
presence of foreign banks is one of the examples of these changes. Despite the fact 
that the role of foreign banks in Russia is quite limited, from the point of view of 
institutional transformation, increased competition and technology transfer the 
essence of foreign banks is very important. Russian banking system is moving 
towards further liberalization, though at present it is hard to imagine Eastern Europe 
scenario (domination of foreign banks in the banking sector).  Coexistence of state-
                                                        
19) Wide definition of a foreign bank. Representative offices while not being financial institutions are 
counted as initial forms of entry.  
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owned banks and growing presence of foreign banks driven by specific motivation for 
entry and using various entry modes and strategies, these two, contradictory at first 
sight, actors of the banking sector, lead the Russian banking market at present and this 
picture of the banking sector is unlikely to change in the near future.  
 
   
 
Note 
The present paper is a part of the master course thesis of the author on the topic 
“Russian banking sector and foreign banks activity” (in Japanese), submitted in 
February 2011 at Graduate School of Economics, Kyoto University. For further info 
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